

The Future of Indirect Evidence


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What is Statistics?

- The theory of *learning from experience* when experience arrives a little bit at a time
- Collecting and combining many small pieces of sometimes contradictory evidence
- *Direct* and *Indirect* statistical evidence

**'Clemente' batting averages over 1970 season:
.400 after 45 at bats; .346 for remainder ; .352 overall**



The Puzzled Physicist

- *Ultrasound*: “Twin Boys”
- *Doctor*: Proportion of twins identical = $\frac{1}{3}$
- *Physicist*: “Probability **my** twins identical?”

Bayes' Rule (1763)

- *Prior Odds* $\frac{\text{Prob}\{\text{Ident}\}}{\text{Prob}\{\text{Not}\}} = \frac{1/3}{2/3} = \frac{1}{2}$
- *Likelihood Ratio* $\frac{\text{Prob}\{\text{Twin Boys}|\text{Ident}\}}{\text{Prob}\{\text{Twin Boys}|\text{Not}\}} = 2$
- *Bayes' Rule*

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Posterior Odds} &= (\text{Prior Odds}) \cdot (\text{Likelihood Ratio}) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot 2 = 1.\end{aligned}$$


- *Answer to Physicist:* “50–50”
- *Crucial Ingredient*

Prior Odds: “Bayesian Prior Distribution”

Learning from Experience

- *Clemente*: Learning from his own experience [direct evidence, “frequentist”]
- *Physicist*: Learning from her own experience (sonogram) and also from the experience of others (prior distribution) [indirect evidence, “Bayesian”]
- *Holy Grail of Statisticians*: Use the experience of others without needing a (subjective) prior distribution
- *Fisher*: “Enjoy the Bayesian omelette without breaking the Bayesian eggs.”

Kidney function scores for 157 healthy volunteers,
and the least squares regression line



age->
predicted score at age 55 is -1.46; single obs is -.01

Large-Scale Regression Algorithms

- LARS, Lasso, Boosting, Bagging, CART, ...
- *Data Mining*
- *Naïve Frequentism*
 - “Chipper Jones has 3 hits in 16 tries vs. Clemens”

Eighteen Baseball Players

(Efron and Morris, 1977)

Name	hits/AB	Observed Avg	“TRUTH”	James–Stein
1. Clemente	18/45	.400	.346	0.290
2. F. Robinson	17/45	.378	.298	0.286
3. F. Howard	16/45	.356	.276	0.281
4. Johnstone	15/45	.333	.222	0.277
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
14. Petrocelli	10/45	.222	.264	0.254
15. E. Rodriguez	10/45	.222	.226	0.254
16. Campaneris	9/45	.200	.286	0.249
17. Munson	8/45	.178	.316	0.244
18. Alvis	7/45	.156	.200	0.239
Grand Average		.265	.265	0.265

James–Stein Estimation

- *Observe* $x_i \stackrel{\text{ind}}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(\mu_i, 1)$, $i = 1, 2, \dots, n (\geq 4)$
- **MLE Estimate** $\hat{\mu}_i^{\text{MLE}} = x_i$ $E \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\hat{\mu}_i^{\text{MLE}} - \mu_i \right)^2 \right\} = n$
- **Bayes Estimate** Assume $\mu_i \stackrel{\text{ind}}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(M, A)$

$$\hat{\mu}_i^{\text{Bayes}} = M + B(x_i - M), \quad B = \frac{A}{A+1}$$


- **James–Stein** “Empirical Bayes”

$$\hat{\mu}_i^{\text{JS}} = \hat{M} + \hat{B} (x_i - \hat{M}) \begin{cases} \hat{M} = \bar{x} \\ \hat{B} = 1 - (n - 3) / \sum (x_i - \bar{x})^2 \end{cases}$$

Stein's Paradox (1956)

- *Theorem* $\hat{\mu}^{\text{JS}}$ **always** beats $\hat{\mu}_i^{\text{MLE}}$
in terms of total expected squared error
(factor of 3.5 less for baseball data)
- If $\mu_i \stackrel{\text{ind}}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(M, A)$: (Bayes risk) (EB penalty)

$$E \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\hat{\mu}_i^{\text{MLE}} - \mu_i \right)^2 \right\} = Bn + 3(1 - B)$$



- **Paradox** Why should Clemente's good performance raise our prediction for Munson? (Indirect evidence!)
- JS is tough on Clemente.

Large-Scale Multiple Inference

- R. G. Miller, *Simultaneous Statistical Inference* (1966):
 $N = 2$ to 10 (frequentist)
- *Microarrays* (1995+): $N = 1000$ to $10,000$
SNP chips: $N = 500,000 +$
- Indirect evidence too important to ignore
- Problems for both frequentists and Bayesians


A Microarray Example

Prostate Data (Singh et al., 2002)


- $N = 6033$ genes $\begin{cases} n_1 = 50 & \text{healthy controls} \\ n_2 = 52 & \text{prostate cancer patients} \end{cases}$
- $t_i =$ two-sample t -stat: patients vs. controls, gene i
- $z_i = \Phi^{-1}F_{100}(t_i)$ (transform to normality)

$$H_0 : z_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1) \quad (\text{"theoretical null"})$$

N=6033 z-values, prostate study



49 of the prostate study z-values exceed 3, compared to null expected value 8.14: $Fdrhat = 8.14/49 = .166$



False Discovery Rates

(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995)

- $\widehat{\text{Fdr}}(z) = \frac{E_0(z)}{N(z)} \begin{cases} E_0(z) = \text{expected number } z_i\text{'s } > z \text{ under } H_0 \\ N(z) = \text{observed number } z_i\text{'s } > z \end{cases}$
- $\widehat{\text{Fdr}}(z) = \frac{8.14}{49} = \frac{1}{6}$
- *Theorem* For a chosen “control value” q let $z_q = \min_z \{ \widehat{\text{Fdr}}(z) \leq q \}$. Then the expected proportion of nulls among the $N(z_q)$ is $\leq q$. [frequentist]
- *Prostate Data* $q = 1/6 : z_q = 3, N(z_q) = 49$

Indirect Evidence and Fdr's

- The “significance” of a given $z_i > 3$ depends on how many other z_i 's exceed 3.
- *Exchangeability*: If $\widehat{Fdr}(z) = 1/6$ then we report that all 49 have probability $1/6$ of being null.
- *Local Fdr*: Instead of $\mathcal{Z} = (3, \infty)$ consider $\mathcal{Z} = (3.0, 3.1)$.

Empirical Bayes Interpretation

- *Bayes:* Prior $\begin{cases} p_0 \text{ null} & z \sim f_0(z) (= \mathcal{N}(0, 1)) \\ p_1 = 1 - p_0 \text{ non-null} & z \sim f_1(z) \end{cases}$

- *Right cdf's* $F_0(z), F_1(z) : F(z) = p_0 F_0(z) + p_1 F_1(z)$

$$\text{Fdr}(z) \equiv \text{Prob}\{\text{gene}_i \text{ null} \mid z_i > z\} = p_0 F_0(z) / F(z)$$

- *Empirical Bayes*


$$\begin{aligned} \widehat{\text{Fdr}}(z) &= p_0 F_0(z) / \hat{F}(z) && \text{where } \hat{F}(z) = \#\{z_i > z\} / N \\ &= N_0(z) / N(z) && \text{as before} \end{aligned}$$

- *BH Rule* Reject “null” for genes with posterior Prob $\leq q$.


The Proper Use of Indirect Evidence

- *Difficulties and Opportunities*
- *The Clemente Problem*: How to protect atypical cases from too much indirect evidence
- *Fdr Theory*: With thousands of z -values, sometimes we can see, and correct, defects in the methodology.


Leukemia data: N=7128 genes, z-values 47 ALL vs 25 AML patients.
Empirical Null $p_0=.93$, $f_0=N(.09, 1.68^2)$. (Efron 2008A)




**Brain data:15443 z-values comparing 6 normals vs 6 dyslexics;
Red >0, Green <0; solids show abs(z)>2**



Compare front of brain (solid hist)
with back (line histogram)




Brain data z-values vs distance from back of brain;
Curves are running percentiles; Efron 2008




Fold-Change or t -Statistics?

- Two-sample Problems $(\bar{x}_i, \bar{y}_i, \hat{\sigma}_i)$ for each gene
- Fold Change (log scale) $S_n = \bar{y}_i - \bar{x}_i$
- t -statistic $T_i = (\bar{y}_i - \bar{x}_i) / \hat{\sigma}_i$
- “Fold change more consistent” • Use for Fdr, etc.?
- Prostate Data Compare genes in lowest, highest quartiles of $\hat{\sigma}_i$

**Fold-change statistics for prostate data;
For genes in lowest and highest quartiles of internal sd**



Same comparison for t-statistic



The Normal Structure Model

(Brown, 1971; Stein, 1981)


- *Model* $\mu \sim g(\cdot)$ and $z|\mu \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, 1)$
- *James–Stein* $g = \mathcal{N}(M, A)$ *Fdr* $g = p_0\delta_0 + p_1g_1$

Theorem $E\{\mu|z\} = z + f'(z)/f(z)$

where $f(z) = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \varphi(z - \mu)g(\mu)d\mu$ (marginal density)

- *Empirical Bayes*
 $z \rightarrow \hat{f}(z) \rightarrow \hat{E}(\mu_i|z_i) = z_i + \hat{f}'(z_i)/\hat{f}(z_i)$

Empirical Bayes estimate of $E\{\mu[i] | z[i]\}$ for prostate data;
Showing 'top 10' genes



The Top Ten Genes

	gene	z-value	\hat{E}
1	610	5.29	4.11
2	1720	4.83	3.65
3	332	4.47	3.24
4	364	-4.42	-3.57
5	914	4.40	3.16
6	3940	-4.33	-3.52
7	4546	-4.29	-3.47
8	1068	4.25	2.99
9	579	4.19	2.92
10	4331	-4.14	-3.30
Sum	Squares	200	116

- $\sum_1^{10} \mu_i^2$ determines prediction accuracy

Selection Bias and Bayes Estimation

- Selection Bias $E\left\{\sum_1^{10} z_i^2\right\} \gg \sum_1^{10} \mu_i^2$
- Bayes if $\tilde{\mu}_i \equiv E\{\mu_i|z_i\}$ then $E\left\{\sum_1^{10} \tilde{\mu}_i^2\right\} \approx \sum_1^{10} \mu_i^2$

(Bayes estimates immune to selection bias)

- Empirical Bayes ?? Depends on N
- Bayes: $N = \infty$

Learning from the Experience of Others

(*Which* others?)

- *Frequentist* Too conservative (stand-alone inferences)
- *Bayesian* Too bold ($N = \infty$)
- *Fisherian* (MLE) Too low-dimensional
- *Empirical Bayes* Nice compromise, but not yet a coherent theory Information? Bias?

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